

Approved For Release 2003/12/19 : CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200018-0

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19 December 1969

SUBJECT: Contingent Employment of Agency U-2's

1. The precise circumstances in which it would be useful or even critical for the US government to have available a deniable or clandestine and fast reacting photo reconnaissance vehicle capable of pin-point targeting and follow up missions cannot be foretold with complete confidence and accuracy. Nonetheless, given the still highly disturbed state of affairs in East and Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, the Middle East, North Africa, and even in the Caribbean and Central America it seems certain that contingencies will develop where the facts are obscure and the need for a US decision urgent. In some such cases, at least, U-2 photography might prove to be the best and most readily available "hard evidence" available.

2. We list below some of the contingencies which can now be envisaged in which employment of clandestinely controlled U-2's might be useful. But we would stress that this list is not intended to be exhaustive; events of the new few years could bring radical changes in certain areas and produce situations not now foreseeable.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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3. The Far East. Most of possible requirements for U-2 coverage in this region arise from the continuing possibility of Chinese Communist troop and logistical buildups in areas adjacent to non-Communist territory: in coastal Fukien Province opposite the GRC-held Offshore Islands; in Yunnan Province adjacent to Laos and Burma, and near Thailand; and in Tibet and Sinkiang along the Himalayan frontiers. Unusual CPR deployment might also occur along China's borders with North Korea or North Vietnam, raising the possibility of subsequent movement through the territory of these Communist neighbors.

4. Scenarios leading to a requirement for high resolution photography at low political risk would probably commence with receipt of other intelligence -- low-level agent reports, [] [] diplomatic rumors, and perhaps satellite photography as well. As the volume of reporting swelled, so would high-level speculation on the scope and meaning of the reported buildup. This has happened often enough in the past, most recently in northeastern Burma and northwestern Laos.* In time, pressure would grow within the intelligence community for procurement of

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* In the latter case, photography has helped clarify immediate Chinese objectives; in contrast, without such photography, understanding of the Chinese activities in Burma is grossly insufficient.

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more accurate information to help confirm or refute the speculation. The most reliable evidence, in the judgment of many Asian analysts, could be provided by good aerial photography of the border zones.

5. While there is presently little or no political problem in surveillance of target areas in Indochina, a formalized settlement of the wars in Laos and Vietnam might by its terms involve cessation of US overhead reconnaissance activities.

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6. Elsewhere in Southeast and South Asia -- there is clearly the possibility that deniable reconnaissance activity would be required in the Sino-Burman and Sino-Indian border zones. It is certain, for example, that policy levels would want the clearest possible reading of any Chinese buildups on the pattern of 1962 along India's northeastern frontiers.

7. Aside from situations in which Communist China might trigger a requirement for good photography, there are potential problems in the Sulu region (between Malaysia and the Philippines -- the Sabah dispute) and in the islands and seas where Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia meet, as well as in Korea.

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8. In the Sulu region, the paramilitary units that might possibly be involved in any Philippine effort to gain a foothold in Sabah are likely to be small but US concern over the implications of this development might justify efforts at verification by photo reconnaissance. It is at least conceivable that relations between, say, Singapore and Malaysia could deteriorate to a point at which Kuala Lumpur (perhaps with Indonesian assistance) contemplates a relatively large-scale invasion of the island. Again, the US might have an urgent need to determine for its own account or that of its friends the exact state of affairs on the ground.

9. In the case of Korea, it is possible to visualize a situation in which other sources have raised concern over a North Korean military buildup in the area of the DMZ. The requirement here would be for a readily available, fast reacting, vehicle capable of obtaining good quality photography to confirm or deny other intelligence.

10. Southwest Asia and the Mediterranean Area. The major case in this region would involve a threatening situation in the Arab-Israeli confrontation in which it would be critical for the US to have its own information; i.e., the US would not have

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to rely on the [] for an account of what had happened or what was going on. The system could be employed, e.g., to search for evidence of troop buildup, preparation for an Israeli or an Egyptian large-scale crossing of the Suez Canal, Israeli preparations for crossing the Jordan on a large scale. It should be emphasized that this system would have utility for a large-scale buildup, average or even substantially bigger-than-average raid preparations would not be susceptible to detection.

11. Developments on Cyprus which caused Turkey to deploy forces to back up a threat of invasion of the island might produce requirements for deniable overflights. The system would probably be of utility in establishing the extent of a Turkish buildup -- concentration of landing craft, troop movements and the like.

12. Less likely in the judgment of this office, but still possible, would be the threat or the actuality of a new round of hostilities in the sub-continent between India and Pakistan. Again the system could be of use in identifying the extent of a buildup and perhaps in following the course of any actual fighting.

13. Remote potential uses might be in the Persian Gulf area, should Iraq and Iran ever come to blows, or along the North African coast.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 17 Dec. 69
TO: Ann		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>[redacted] from ONE left the attached.</p> <p>This paper was prepared by ONE in response to a report from Dr. Steininger and pertains to information <u>Mr. Duckett will</u> <u>need for the 303 Committee</u> <u>meeting tomorrow.</u></p>		
FROM: Sue		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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